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Introduction

What is at stake when a group of major modernist writers centers their fiction on unknowing? Decades of reflection about Western modernism
reduce to the implications of this question. Modernist and unknowing in
relation to what premodernist commitment to knowing? Modernist and
unknowing in relation to what postmodern and postcolonial stances
toward knowing? What began as microcosmic attention to certain compelling fictional effects among a handful of twentieth-century writers escalated, to my surprise, to a speculative, macrocosmic mapping of one genre
of Western imagination: a sort of metahistory of the novel.
This book redefines the project of Western modernism by arguing that
the primary work of three of its central novelists—Franz Kafka, Marcel
Proust, and William Faulkner—consists in strenuous acts of unknowing. 1
Their art represents human experience outside the protocols of Western
knowing. Those protocols, descending from tenets and practices of
Enlightenment, inform the preponderance of European realist fiction. By
contrast, Kafka, Proust, and Faulkner join Sigmund Freud to make a
quartet of twentieth-century explorers of unknowing. They each attend to
the blind spots of this realist model of achieved knowledge and self-knowledge. Though it took the different cultural situations of Prague, Paris, and
rural Mississippi to produce them, the fiction of each found its way into the
same unthought of Western thinking. Each determined that inherited cultural models of maturation—of corning to know other and self—misrepresented the drama of the modern subject.2
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I unpack unknowing by exploring the interrelation of three of its crucial
terms: subject, space, and time. Coming to J^now enacts an Enlightenment
premise of rational correspondence between the individual and the world.
Thanks to the lawfulness of time and space, a subject learns to map the
outer world accurately and, thereby, to achieve inner orientation as well.
Personal identity gets confirmed by way of this arduously achieved knowledge of exterior entities. On this model, the subject who would know and
the object to be known are assumed to share an implicit structural affinity—the latter destined to enter the embrace of the former. Indeed, realism
cannot proceed without this assumption. Yet realism denies that it assumes
anything, that the "marriage" it celebrates at the end has been secretly
arranged before the beginning, that a preemptive alliance between knowing subject and knowable object, mappable space and enabling time, has
already been silently set in place. Instead, realism proposes—and this is its
master stroke—that the representational field of space and time and others
that its protagonist moves through corresponds to the objective world
itself. Its stage thus artfully configured to enable the coming resolutions,
realism denies that it has stacked the deck (or pre-arranged the cards),
insisting instead on its protagonist as a free-standing subject moving
within a lawful and indifferent frame.
This insistence on free-standing subjectivity is precisely what modernist
fiction subverts. It does so in order to reveal the human subject as situational, space/time dependent, capable of coming to know only if the props
that enable knowing are already in place. If, however, a writer disrupts the
subject's compact for negotiating objects in space and time, the subject loses
its orientational grasp on others and, in so doing, loses its own coherent
identity. The work of Kafka, Proust, and Faulkner dramatizes such an
uncohering. In their work, the narrative props that underwrite the subject/space/time drama of coming to know are refused. In the place of
knowing, there operates a dynamic of shock; in the place of developmental
life-histories, there occur unmastered moments. When space becomes
uncanny rather than lawful (no longer open to orientation and ownership),
whe time loses its negotiability (no longer linear/progressive), things
become unfamiliar; the subject immersed in them becomes unfamiliar as
well. The represented world itself exits from its former "liberal" condition
as knowable, masterable, conducive to progress. These are flashpoints both
of my novelists' work and of that larger subversion of Western cultural
forms that we think of as modernism.
Although this book might open with the Enlightenment premises that
my modernist writers refuse, I begin by "leaping" into arguably the first
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protomodern narrative of failed knowing: S0ren Kierkegaard's Fear and
Trembling (1843). Live or tell, Jean-Paul Sartre's Nausea declares a century
later: live your life as an unknowable movement through as yet unencountered time, or tell it as a narrative already end-supplied and heading
toward its goal.3 But already in Kierkegaard the Abraham drama transforms from a comfortable, end-assured "telling" (a model of temporal
development: Abraham the promised father of his people) to an intolerable
"living" (Abraham the going-to-be murderer), the exposed subject undergoing an ordeal of the unresolved moment that Kierkegaard refuses to
bring to resolution. It takes forever to get to, and get past, the sacrifice on
Mount Moriah. No one (not Abraham, nor Kierkegaard, nor the reader)
can pacify an intolerable now that has been sprung free from the clarifying
knowledge of what is to come later.
The clarifying knowledge of what is to come later: coming to know,
gradually refining one's identity within orientational space and linear time,
is the bread and butter of Western fiction. No social cohesion can occur
without normative scripts for how individuals are to sustain identity in
space and time; as the Frankfurt School critic Theodor Adorno has
claimed, "identity is the primal category of ideology."4 Modernist "unknowing" operates, precisely, as an attack on the confidence in Western norms for
securing identity and funding the career of the liberal subject. After the
"leap into Kierkegaard, part 1 attends to the emergence of Western norms
of "k wing" by drawing on several representative thinkers. 5 I propose an
"Enlightenment narrative" in five stages: the (Baconian) establishment of
observational procedures, Rene Descartes's birthing of the knowing subject,
Isaac Newton's articulation of a spatial/temporal "System of the World,"
John Locke's fashioning of the liberal/inductive plot of coming to know,
and Immanuel Kant's moralizing of the narrative. The anatomy of realism that follows traces this Enlightenment narrative in realist fiction from
Daniel Defoe to Fyodor Dostoevsky. I am here interested less in sustained
"readings" than in catching out the unemphatic protocols of knowing (the
operative subject/space/time paradigm) that regulate realist fiction. In
Crime and Punishment the Enlightenment narrative succeeds and shatters,
in equal measure. To grasp the logic of subjectivity as a scene of shattering, however, one needs an interpretive frame unavailable to Enlightenment thought.
Part 2—the center of the book—attends to "Modernist Unknowing."
To analyze modernist refusal of realist protocols of knowing, I begin with
an architect of modernist thinking: Freud. Freud's fundamental concepts—defenses and repression as shaping forces guaranteeing the errors of
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consciousness (the subject as other); the uncanny as a spatial fault line testifying to the projectiveness of ego (its "bleeding" into space); trauma as the
wound to psyche that makes it inhabit a temporality both then and now
(the subject "bleeding" into time)—offer to the literary critic a cornucopia
of insights into the dynamic of unknowing. The work of Kafka, Proust,
and Faulkner configures these insights as narrative forms (even as realist
narrative configures Enlightenment convictions as narrative forms).
Analysis of Freudian reshaping of space, time, and subjectivity prepares
the way for this book's three central chapters. Attending comparatively to
the work (mainly) of Proust, Kafka, and Faulkner, these chapters focus on
uncanny space, unbound time, and the subject-as-other. Uncanny space
turns unlawful; things slip, lose their familiarity (or are hauntingly familiar
even though unknown). Unbound time forfeits linearity; progress comes to
a halt. Modernist narrative involves the discovery, not of who one is (the
drama of knowing), but that one is other. All three chapters argue that, as
the fictional subject's compact with reliable (reconfirming) space and time
founders, a poetics of knowing cedes to one of unknowing.
Kafka, Proust, and Faulkner knew Freud's work, but I do not explore
influence. Rather, they creatively share Freud's sense of the subject's selfblindness as enacted in the experiencing of space/time. Refusing all forms
of knowing, Kafka's fiction hones in magnetically on vertigo, arrest, undoing; in Adorno's phrase, "his power is one of demolition."6 The subject,
spawned by the social, does not own itself, cannot liberate itself, cannot
even sustain its human shape. The reader as well remains blind-sighted—
reading as a social and psycho-analysis that never delivers the enlightenment of knowing. Proust likewise reshapes the subject/space/time model.
His figures are dispossessed over time and (except for the privileged and
disembodied narrator) do not know this. Conscious memory denatures and
instrumentally revises the past. The extension of space menaces the Proustian subject (others are accessible only through the subject's falsifying lenses)
no less than the passage of time. Faulkner registers in a different way the
racial/gender fallout from a failed Enlightenment model of maturation.
The reverberating collapse of the Old South instructs him that the progress
model does not obtain. He centers his experimental fiction on moments of
collapse, redeploying time (refusing its linearity) in order to keep it from
serving as a medium that accommodates coming to know.
Part 3, "Beyond Knowing," attends to two contemporary projects for
writing past the arrest and anxiety of modernist unknowing. The first is a
genre of postmodern fiction that, rather than tell the story of subjects
undone within a social space/time that has ceased to orient, rehearses a
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narrative of "vocabularies."7 Such fiction releases narrative from the failed
project of knowing. Knowing assumes a viable purchase on the exterior
world; this assumption tends to be revoked in the postmodern fiction
under consideration. Staging brief modernist-postmodern encounters
between Faulkner and Thomas Pynchon, between Rainer Maria Rilke
and Italo Calvino, and between E. M. Forster and Salman Rushdie, I show
how modernist anxiety about subject orientation is replaced, in postmodern texts, by a variety of "flights"—escape from Newtonian gravity.
Finally, I consider the postcolonial genre of magic realism, by comparing Faulknerian arrest with the various modes of release that flourish in
the fiction of Gabriel Garcia Marquez and Toni Morrison. Both successor
writers, though influenced by Faulkner, refuse the epistemological drive of
his tragic fiction. Their postcolonial texts articulate the desire for release by
reconfiguring the subject within a communal sphere no longer calibrated
according to Newtonian gravity, Cartesian mastery, Lockean pursuit of a
commodity-marked liberty. In a word, a communal sphere no longer
knowable as Western Enlightenment has insisted for more than two centuries (in its philosophy, its economics, its colonizing, and its fiction) that
the spatial/temporal globe is knowable—and as such, open to orientation,
acquisition, and progress.8
The work of Emmanuel Levinas provides a valuable lens on the collapse of selfhood in modernist fiction.9 His critique of the Western commitment to being (as little more, finally, than a sublime ego-logy) reveals
some of the stakes of this collapse. Adorno serves as a procedural guide in
the measure that he understands art objects to be—no matter how profoundly invested in the social setting in which they emerge—singular entities. One attends to them best by respecting their singularity (which is
formal, not argumentative)—without sentimentalizing them, but also
without immersing them (and losing their distinctiveness) within an
archive of innumerable other discourses to which they are related. I draw
further on both Adorno and his peer Walter Benjamin for an underlying
conviction of this book: that works of art engage the social in ways all the
more precious for being formally indirect; that readers engage works of art
in ways not foredoomed to misrecognition. Such engagement is best
understood not as knowing but as acknowledgment—the other not objectified and mapped, but encountered nevertheless.
Respect for the singularity of artworks operates as more than a slogan
in this study; it guides its procedures. Large claims about the assumptions
and procedures of Western fiction rest on a deliberately reduced number
of instances and analyses. My intent is the opposite of cavalier. If I am to
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persuade my reader of the value of these claims—rather than just their
abstract plausibility—I must show the claims at work aesthetically and
extensively, emerging through the demonstrable behavior of texts themselves. To achieve this, I often have to demonstrate, and that (if done
responsibly) takes up space. I therefore offer these selected instances and
analyses more as ideal types—revealing tendencies—than as any statistically compelling survey of the field under consideration. In a word, I
count on their resonance. In bearing down on Freud, Proust, Kafka, and
Faulkner, I aim to illuminate more than their discrete modernist practices.
They serve as the center for a set of claims whose circumference has taken
me decades to identify and explore.
Of Freud's interpretive terms, it is condensation, not displacement, that
matters in my inquiry: condensation (within the artwork itself) as an
overdetermined play of meaning-effects not to be sorted out in any straightline causality; condensation (within the interpretive act) as the con-fusing of
investments (authorial, readerly, social); condensation as metaphoric in its
working rather than metonymic. Rather than the god term of difference
(which governs so much contemporary cultural discourse), rather than the
genre of allegory (which Benjamin helped to launch into that discourse and
which has fetishized the element of loss or disfigurement in our dealin
with the other), I seek a form of meaning-making that Benjamin himself
achieved in unparalleled fashion: symbolism (modern, not Coleridgean).10
To see how things go together requires a strenuous undoing of how they are
normally said to go together (as knowing subject and object known). This
book shares Benjamin's belief that "our coming was expected," our
encounter with the past and its productions can take place. "If there is hope
in Kafka's work," Adorno writes, it is "in the capacity to stand up to the
worst by making it into language" (Prisms, 254). Because of such acts of language, we engage what is not us, and the encounter that is the aim of this
book is not only possible, but hopeful.
Modernism has been read throughout the past century as anything but
hopeful, yet if we place it between realism and postmodernism, we can better decipher its promise. First, a hopefulness that begins by refusing the
narratives of progress the West has used since the seventeenth century to
characterize its own history. ("To believe in progress," Kafka writes, "is not
to believe that progress has already taken place. That would be no
belief.")11 Such hopefulness is not to be confused with optimism, and its
articulation occurs outside the terms of realist resolution. In modernist art,
time and space do not resolve into docile conditions enabling the subject to
center; the modernist narrative refuses to mimic a plot resolution it finds
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missing in the real. The hopefulness of modernism is diagnostic, not predicative—providing a resonant take upon troubles rather than a fantasy
solution to them. "Progress is at home not in the continuity of the flow of
time," Benjamin writes, "but in its interferences: wherever something genuinely new makes itself felt for the first time with the sobriety of dawn."12
The "dawn" such works fleetingly grasp invokes a fullness of being absent
from the now-unbearable real: Faulkner's "might-have-been," Proust's
moment of the lost past suddenly reconfigured in the present, Kafka's revelation that our "own" body is imprinted by a social machine writing in a
foreign script. In these instances, the real emerges in all its deformation:
where we are yet do not wish to be.
I say "we" because the second dimension of modernist hopefulness is its
investment in its readers.13 What is precious in this modernist literature is
the identificatory traffic between reader and text. The diagnostic charge
wrought into the text's experimental form is meant to release within the
reader's subjectivity. Awaken—this charge insists—from the sleep of
knowing into the strangeness of unknowing. "You must change your life,"
Rilke's torso of Apollo demands of its observer: "for here there is no place /
that does not see you."14 If the first dimension of modernist hopefulness
reveals its difference from realist optimism, this second dimension reveals
its difference from a postmodern literature of "vocabularies." In modernism, as in Benjamin's "aura," the art object looks back. In this
encounter it connects us with what is not now, not here, not us. Such
encounters are the signature move of the modernist fiction under study
here, revealing their full value only in a postmodern climate that forswears
art's capacity to stage encounters, a climate in which all that remains of the
past are its alienated commodities, its mass-produced images, its codified
languages. Modernism is finally about the dead's capacity still to speak: not
as contemporaries (as in realism), nor as solipsistic fantasy (as in postmodernism). Instead, the dead speak a language we must learn to "unknow" if
we are to hear it. Such hearing-as-unknowing is this literature's demand,
made in the Utopian conviction that we shall not begin to recover our lives
in space and time until we grasp the extent to which we have—all
unknowing—lost them.
Modernism was for a long time in bad odor in the academy—stereotyped as highbrow, white-male, coterie-focused. To counter this reading, a
wide range of recent materialist studies of modernism has attended to its
imbrication with contemporary developments in science, technology, and
mass culture. (One undeclared aim of this recent work has been to demonstrate modernism's resemblance to a postmodernist literature that openly
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declares its attachment to such phenomena.) I have learned much from this
work, but my book goes another way. The protocols of the realist practice
that came before modernism, and of the postmodern and postcolonial
practices that come after it, allow me to bring into visibility what was most
at stake in modernist experimentation. My book is enabled, then, by two
final convictions: that modernist fiction attends to conditions of life that
most men and women in the West experience (though few imagine in a
sustained way), and that it is necessary to read this literature within an
inclusive Western frame (broader than the "localism" of cultural studies) if
one would see how it stages the crisis of the liberal, knowing subject.
Scrutiny of this crisis permits a deeper recognition of what it means to
belong to the West. I seek to show in what ways that is this literature's
beauty and its burden.
Let me close on a note that is at once personal yet charged—as I have come
to see—with more than personal significance. Over three decades ago, on a
night I do not forget, I underwent a life-altering experience. I was a young
assistant professor, struggling to sustain both my domestic and my professional identities, and—unused to drugs even though this was the late
1960s—I spent an evening smoking marijuana. This activity seemed for a
while to have no results; then suddenly I experienced an internal commotion such as I had never known before. My body shook uncontrollably. I
seemed to be imploding and exploding, I had to move at once. I passed the
next hours walking up and down deserted neighborhood streets—my wife
and a friend each holding one of my arms—trying to negotiate recurrent
waves of inner disarray. My mind was not my own. Paranoid fantasy scenarios arose as though real. Space and time lost their moorings. Events
replayed themselves; the streets got larger or smaller, nearer or farther, on
their own. After I was finally calm enough to get into bed, I trembled until
dawn. For the next two years I could not speak of this event without in a
certain measure bringing it on again. A year thereafter, relocated elsewhere, I wrote the experience down. From that point on I began to gain
distance from it and control over it.
This book on modernism arises primarily from my professional interests, but it grows out of that personal experience as well. Pathological
though it was, that episode luridly highlighted for me the fragility of
assumptions we in the West have learned to take for granted. Until then I
had more or less envisaged my life as a naturally sanctioned narrative of
realism. Things in the past had developed in an iterative, familiar way. By
dint of luck, skill, and application, I assumed I would in time succeed, both

I uction 9

9

domestically and professionally. The world I was yet to encounter was, if
unknown, familiarizable. It would accommodate my eventual flourishing;
it was there, so to speak, for that purpose. None of this was guaranteed, but
the developmental assumptions underlying it seemed self-evident. Trauma
I knew nothing about. My mind and body had always been reasonably
enough under control; situations I had encountered were eventually supportive of my will. Why would a satisfying career not be in the offing?
I have had that satisfying career, but during the past thirty-five years I
have become increasingly aware of the Western bias wrought into the narrative model underlying it. The figure/ground assumptions I drew on
emphasized the magnitude of the figure, trivializing the role of the
ground. My sense of my capacity to shape my world—to exploit its temporality, to domesticate its spatiality—was skewed. Skewed not in some personal/psychological way, but skewed culturally: I had been taught to expect
what I expected. I was born, I thought, to become the creator (or at least
the architect) of my scene. To be the creature within it made little sense;
what sense it made was demeaning.
In time I came to recognize the larger Lockean dimensions of my figure/ground model. The right to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness"
was a birthright of the European Enlightenment—conceptualized in 1690,
put (by the American colonies) into revolutionary practice nearly a century
later. I was free to become (in the latest and most degraded version of the
motto) "all that I could become," b e the West had, for some three centuries, liberated itself from custom sufficiently to proclaim this emancipatory program for (a subset of) its citizens. It was as familiar as mother's
milk because the immigrant European families that gave birth to my parents had, in coming to America, taught them the same program from their
infancy onward. It was no less familiar in the American, British, and
French novels I devoured in childhood and adolescence, the home I grew
up in, the schools I attended.
Kafka, Proust, Faulkner, and Freud did not, of course, single-handedly
subvert the Enlightenment project of knowledge in its two directions:
knowledge of the larger world, consequent knowledge of oneself. But,
among the early-twentieth-century modernists, they were—for me—the
ones who most powerfully reconfigured the figure/ground model underlying the realist practice that had held the stage since the eighteenth century.
Each represented the ground not only as more shaping than the figure but
as licensing the possibility of the figure. Each recognized that the other
comes before—and looms larger than—the self. Each understood that the
creator rises out of the creature, and that the creature remains present
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within the creator. Each grasped that time can stand still rather than pass,
that space can disorient rather than promote empowerment, that human
subjects, all unaware, "bleed into" the scenes they inhabit. Each wrote narratives in which the drama of unknowing—of having to unknow, of realizing that one does not know and perhaps cannot know—takes priority
over the progressive drama of coming to know oneself and one's world.
More than two centuries of Enlightenment-inspired realism prepare the
coming of modernist fiction. Only against a backdrop of protocols of
knowing so long established as to operate unthinkingly does an insistence
on unknowing reveal its stakes. I launch this study of modernism, however, not with the emergence of the knowledge project, but rather with the
menace to that project that occurs when, suddenly, one's dearest assumptions (those on which sanity depends) cease to operate: Kierkegaard's Fear
and Trembling.

